-	CENTRAL INT	or Release 2011/11/10 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002300270007-4 TELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT	
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- cessful thirty years ago, in an earlier phase of the class struggle. Today these methods represent an altogether unrealistic policy. The (agitation and propaganda) preparations in the shops and factories were totally inadequate, and the population felt that something was being forced upon them. This resulted in a total failure to support the new city administration and the revolutionary movement suprorting it.
- The SED policy must be based on the above two points. Thus it is absolutely stupid to demand publicly that the Western Powers withdraw when it is known that -- as a matter of political reality -- the power of the (working) class enemy has been absolutely stabilized. Now, that it can no longer be expected that western Berlin will collapse, two measures are essential: Despite all economic difficulties in the Soviet Zone, measures must be adopted in the immediate future which will enable the Soviet Sector of Berlin to become an enviable example to the western sectors in all economic and sociological fields. Under no circumstances must one proceed according to dogmatic principles alone. All auxiliary weapons, including those of the enemy, must be utilized to demonstrate the

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advantageous position of the Soviet Sector. Hand in hand with this there must be an intensified cell-organizing activity in every western Berlin factory, shop, and apartment house. The primary purpose of these cells is to point out the difference between the Eastern (Berlin) example and the Western distress. The difficulties resulting from large-scale loss of employment — unavoidable during the coming weeks in West Berlin — together with the increasing scarcities will not be pointed up in mass demonstrations, but by intensified propaganda. Subtle propaganda and exemplary deeds will finally lead the SED to success. But there is not much time. The weeks until early February are the most important, because it is then that the difficulties imposed by the blockade will be most noticeable.

c. Based on these considerations, the new Party line is: No more conspicuous statements that the Western Powers will soon retire from Berlin but emphasis on the propagandizing of the advantages to be found in the East. It has been proved that the Berlin problem cannot be solved by dramatic acts as long as the Western Powers continue to regard Berlin as a political question of primary importance. Therefore, a quiet penetration of western Berlin is more important than noisy action. The Soviets have no interest in creating disorder, especially while the Berlin problem is still on the UN agenda. The important thing is to draw the world's attention away from the "dramatic" aspects of the Berlin struggle, in order to insure the continued advancement of "progressive democratization" in all other fields. The task of the SED is, therefore, more than ever: exemplary routine work in the Soviet Sector and systematic penetration of the western sectors.

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